Samba 4.4.2 – Release Notes

Samba 4.4.2 Available for Download

Samba 4.4.2 (gzipped)
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Patch (gzipped) from Samba 4.4.0 to 4.4.1
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Patch (gzipped) from Samba 4.4.1 to 4.4.2
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                   =============================
                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.2
                           April 12, 2016
                   =============================

This is a security release containing one additional
regression fix for the security release 4.4.1.

This fixes a regression that prevents things like 'net ads join'
from working against a Windows 2003 domain.

Changes since 4.4.1:
====================

o  Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
     April 12th, 2016

Release notes for the original 4.4.1 release follows:
-----------------------------------------------------

                   =============================
                   Release Notes for Samba 4.4.1
                           April 12, 2016
                   =============================


This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:

o  CVE-2015-5370 (Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code)

o  CVE-2016-2110 (Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP)

o  CVE-2016-2111 (NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability)

o  CVE-2016-2112 (LDAP client and server don't enforce integrity)

o  CVE-2016-2113 (Missing TLS certificate validation)

o  CVE-2016-2114 ("server signing = mandatory" not enforced)

o  CVE-2016-2115 (SMB IPC traffic is not integrity protected)

o  CVE-2016-2118 (SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible)

The number of changes are rather huge for a security release,
compared to typical security releases.

Given the number of problems and the fact that they are all related
to man in the middle attacks we decided to fix them all at once
instead of splitting them.

In order to prevent the man in the middle attacks it was required
to change the (default) behavior for some protocols. Please see the
"New smb.conf options" and "Behavior changes" sections below.

=======
Details
=======

o  CVE-2015-5370

   Versions of Samba from 3.6.0 to 4.4.0 inclusive are vulnerable to
   denial of service attacks (crashes and high cpu consumption)
   in the DCE-RPC client and server implementations. In addition,
   errors in validation of the DCE-RPC packets can lead to a downgrade
   of a secure connection to an insecure one.

   While we think it is unlikely, there's a nonzero chance for
   a remote code execution attack against the client components,
   which are used by smbd, winbindd and tools like net, rpcclient and
   others. This may gain root access to the attacker.

   The above applies all possible server roles Samba can operate in.

   Note that versions before 3.6.0 had completely different marshalling
   functions for the generic DCE-RPC layer. It's quite possible that
   that code has similar problems!

   The downgrade of a secure connection to an insecure one may
   allow an attacker to take control of Active Directory object
   handles created on a connection created from an Administrator
   account and re-use them on the now non-privileged connection,
   compromising the security of the Samba AD-DC.

o  CVE-2016-2110:

   There are several man in the middle attacks possible with
   NTLMSSP authentication.

   E.g. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
   can be cleared by a man in the middle.

   This was by protocol design in earlier Windows versions.

   Windows Server 2003 RTM and Vista RTM introduced a way
   to protect against the trivial downgrade.

   See MsvAvFlags and flag 0x00000002 in
   https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236646.aspx

   This new feature also implies support for a mechlistMIC
   when used within SPNEGO, which may prevent downgrades
   from other SPNEGO mechs, e.g. Kerberos, if sign or
   seal is finally negotiated.

   The Samba implementation doesn't enforce the existence of
   required flags, which were requested by the application layer,
   e.g. LDAP or SMB1 encryption (via the unix extensions).
   As a result a man in the middle can take over the connection.
   It is also possible to misguide client and/or
   server to send unencrypted traffic even if encryption
   was explicitly requested.

   LDAP (with NTLMSSP authentication) is used as a client
   by various admin tools of the Samba project,
   e.g. "net", "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit", ...

   As an active directory member server LDAP is also used
   by the winbindd service when connecting to domain controllers.

   Samba also offers an LDAP server when running as
   active directory domain controller.

   The NTLMSSP authentication used by the SMB1 encryption
   is protected by smb signing, see CVE-2015-5296.

o  CVE-2016-2111:

   It's basically the same as CVE-2015-0005 for Windows:

     The NETLOGON service in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2,
     Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold
     and R2, when a Domain Controller is configured, allows remote
     attackers to spoof the computer name of a secure channel's
     endpoint, and obtain sensitive session information, by running a
     crafted application and leveraging the ability to sniff network
     traffic, aka "NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability".

   The vulnerability in Samba is worse as it doesn't require
   credentials of a computer account in the domain.

   This only applies to Samba running as classic primary domain controller,
   classic backup domain controller or active directory domain controller.

   The security patches introduce a new option called "raw NTLMv2 auth"
   ("yes" or "no") for the [global] section in smb.conf.
   Samba (the smbd process) will reject client using raw NTLMv2
   without using NTLMSSP.

   Note that this option also applies to Samba running as
   standalone server and member server.

   You should also consider using "lanman auth = no" (which is already the default)
   and "ntlm auth = no". Have a look at the smb.conf manpage for further details,
   as they might impact compatibility with older clients. These also
   apply for all server roles.

o  CVE-2016-2112:

   Samba uses various LDAP client libraries, a builtin one and/or the system
   ldap libraries (typically openldap).

   As active directory domain controller Samba also provides an LDAP server.

   Samba takes care of doing SASL (GSS-SPNEGO) authentication with Kerberos or NTLMSSP
   for LDAP connections, including possible integrity (sign) and privacy (seal)
   protection.

   Samba has support for an option called "client ldap sasl wrapping" since version
   3.2.0. Its default value has changed from "plain" to "sign" with version 4.2.0.

   Tools using the builtin LDAP client library do not obey the
   "client ldap sasl wrapping" option. This applies to tools like:
   "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Some of them have command line
   options like "--sign" and "--encrypt". With the security update they will
   also obey the "client ldap sasl wrapping" option as default.

   In all cases, even if explicitly request via "client ldap sasl wrapping",
   "--sign" or "--encrypt", the protection can be downgraded by a man in the
   middle.

   The LDAP server doesn't have an option to enforce strong authentication
   yet. The security patches will introduce a new option called
   "ldap server require strong auth", possible values are "no",
   "allow_sasl_over_tls" and "yes".

   As the default behavior was as "no" before, you may
   have to explicitly change this option until all clients have
   been adjusted to handle LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED errors.
   Windows clients and Samba member servers already use
   integrity protection.

o  CVE-2016-2113:

   Samba has support for TLS/SSL for some protocols:
   ldap and http, but currently certificates are not
   validated at all. While we have a "tls cafile" option,
   the configured certificate is not used to validate
   the server certificate.

   This applies to ldaps:// connections triggered by tools like:
   "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Note that it only applies
   to the ldb tools when they are built as part of Samba or with Samba
   extensions installed, which means the Samba builtin LDAP client library is
   used.

   It also applies to dcerpc client connections using ncacn_http (with https://),
   which are only used by the openchange project. Support for ncacn_http
   was introduced in version 4.2.0.

   The security patches will introduce a new option called
   "tls verify peer". Possible values are "no_check", "ca_only",
   "ca_and_name_if_available", "ca_and_name" and "as_strict_as_possible".

   If you use the self-signed certificates which are auto-generated
   by Samba, you won't have a crl file and need to explicitly
   set "tls verify peer = ca_and_name".

o  CVE-2016-2114

   Due to a regression introduced in Samba 4.0.0,
   an explicit "server signing = mandatory" in the [global] section
   of the smb.conf was not enforced for clients using the SMB1 protocol.

   As a result it does not enforce smb signing and allows man in the middle attacks.

   This problem applies to all possible server roles:
   standalone server, member server, classic primary domain controller,
   classic backup domain controller and active directory domain controller.

   In addition, when Samba is configured with "server role = active directory domain controller"
   the effective default for the "server signing" option should be "mandatory".

   During the early development of Samba 4 we had a new experimental
   file server located under source4/smb_server. But before
   the final 4.0.0 release we switched back to the file server
   under source3/smbd.

   But the logic for the correct default of "server signing" was not
   ported correctly ported.

   Note that the default for server roles other than active directory domain
   controller, is "off" because of performance reasons.

o  CVE-2016-2115:

   Samba has an option called "client signing", this is turned off by default
   for performance reasons on file transfers.

   This option is also used when using DCERPC with ncacn_np.

   In order to get integrity protection for ipc related communication
   by default the "client ipc signing" option is introduced.
   The effective default for this new option is "mandatory".

   In order to be compatible with more SMB server implementations,
   the following additional options are introduced:
   "client ipc min protocol" ("NT1" by default) and
   "client ipc max protocol" (the highest support SMB2/3 dialect by default).
   These options overwrite the "client min protocol" and "client max protocol"
   options, because the default for "client max protocol" is still "NT1".
   The reason for this is the fact that all SMB2/3 support SMB signing,
   while there are still SMB1 implementations which don't offer SMB signing
   by default (this includes Samba versions before 4.0.0).

   Note that winbindd (in versions 4.2.0 and higher) enforces SMB signing
   against active directory domain controllers despite of the
   "client signing" and "client ipc signing" options.

o  CVE-2016-2118 (a.k.a. BADLOCK):

   The Security Account Manager Remote Protocol [MS-SAMR] and the
   Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAD]
   are both vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. Both are application level
   protocols based on the generic DCE 1.1 Remote Procedure Call (DCERPC) protocol.

   These protocols are typically available on all Windows installations
   as well as every Samba server. They are used to maintain
   the Security Account Manager Database. This applies to all
   roles, e.g. standalone, domain member, domain controller.

   Any authenticated DCERPC connection a client initiates against a server
   can be used by a man in the middle to impersonate the authenticated user
   against the SAMR or LSAD service on the server.

   The client chosen application protocol, auth type (e.g. Kerberos or NTLMSSP)
   and auth level (NONE, CONNECT, PKT_INTEGRITY, PKT_PRIVACY) do not matter
   in this case. A man in the middle can change auth level to CONNECT
   (which means authentication without message protection) and take over
   the connection.

   As a result, a man in the middle is able to get read/write access to the
   Security Account Manager Database, which reveals all passwords
   and any other potential sensitive information.

   Samba running as an active directory domain controller is additionally
   missing checks to enforce PKT_PRIVACY for the
   Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol [MS-DRSR] (drsuapi)
   and the BackupKey Remote Protocol [MS-BKRP] (backupkey).
   The Domain Name Service Server Management Protocol [MS-DNSP] (dnsserver)
   is not enforcing at least PKT_INTEGRITY.

====================
New smb.conf options
====================

  allow dcerpc auth level connect (G)

    This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to be used with
    DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication, but no per
    message integrity nor privacy protection.

    Some interfaces like samr, lsarpc and netlogon have a hard-coded default
    of no and epmapper, mgmt and rpcecho have a hard-coded default of yes.

    The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc,
    netlogon, samr, srvsvc, winreg, wkssvc ...) by using
    'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.

    This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
    E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
    The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.

    Default: allow dcerpc auth level connect = no

    Example: allow dcerpc auth level connect = yes

  client ipc signing (G)

    This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use
    SMB signing for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport. Possible
    values are auto, mandatory and disabled.

    When set to mandatory or default, SMB signing is required.

    When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and
    if set to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.

    Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
    always enforce signing.

    Default: client ipc signing = default

  client ipc max protocol (G)

    The value of the parameter (a string) is the highest protocol level that will
    be supported for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.

    Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
    in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.

    The value default refers to the latest supported protocol, currently SMB3_11.

    See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
    The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.

    Default: client ipc max protocol = default

    Example: client ipc max protocol = SMB2_10

  client ipc min protocol (G)

    This setting controls the minimum protocol version that the will be
    attempted to use for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.

    Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
    in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.

    The value default refers to the higher value of NT1 and the
    effective value of "client min protocol".

    See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
    The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.

    Default: client ipc min protocol = default

    Example: client ipc min protocol = SMB3_11

  ldap server require strong auth (G)

    The ldap server require strong auth defines whether the
    ldap server requires ldap traffic to be signed or
    signed and encrypted (sealed). Possible values are no,
    allow_sasl_over_tls and yes.

    A value of no allows simple and sasl binds over all transports.

    A value of allow_sasl_over_tls allows simple and sasl binds (without sign or seal)
    over TLS encrypted connections. Unencrypted connections only
    allow sasl binds with sign or seal.

    A value of yes allows only simple binds over TLS encrypted connections.
    Unencrypted connections only allow sasl binds with sign or seal.

    Default: ldap server require strong auth = yes

  raw NTLMv2 auth (G)

    This parameter determines whether or not smbd(8) will allow SMB1 clients
    without extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.

    If this option, lanman auth and ntlm auth are all disabled, then only
    clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted. That means NTLMv2 is only
    supported within NTLMSSP.

    Default: raw NTLMv2 auth = no

  tls verify peer (G)

    This controls if and how strict the client will verify the peer's
    certificate and name. Possible values are (in increasing order): no_check,
    ca_only, ca_and_name_if_available, ca_and_name and as_strict_as_possible.

    When set to no_check the certificate is not verified at all,
    which allows trivial man in the middle attacks.

    When set to ca_only the certificate is verified to be signed from a ca
    specified in the "tls ca file" option. Setting "tls ca file" to a valid file
    is required. The certificate lifetime is also verified. If the "tls crl file"
    option is configured, the certificate is also verified against
    the ca crl.

    When set to ca_and_name_if_available all checks from ca_only are performed.
    In addition, the peer hostname is verified against the certificate's
    name, if it is provided by the application layer and not given as
    an ip address string.

    When set to ca_and_name all checks from ca_and_name_if_available are performed.
    In addition the peer hostname needs to be provided and even an ip
    address is checked against the certificate's name.

    When set to as_strict_as_possible all checks from ca_and_name are performed.
    In addition the "tls crl file" needs to be configured. Future versions
    of Samba may implement additional checks.

    Default: tls verify peer = as_strict_as_possible

  tls priority (G) (backported from Samba 4.3 to Samba 4.2)

    This option can be set to a string describing the TLS protocols to be
    supported in the parts of Samba that use GnuTLS, specifically the AD DC.

    The default turns off SSLv3, as this protocol is no longer considered
    secure after CVE-2014-3566 (otherwise known as POODLE) impacted SSLv3 use
    in HTTPS applications.

    The valid options are described in the GNUTLS Priority-Strings
    documentation at http://gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html

    Default: tls priority = NORMAL:-VERS-SSL3.0

================
Behavior changes
================

o  The default auth level for authenticated binds has changed from
   DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
   That means ncacn_ip_tcp:server is now implicitly the same
   as ncacn_ip_tcp:server[sign] and offers a similar protection
   as ncacn_np:server, which relies on smb signing.

o  The following constraints are applied to SMB1 connections:

   - "client lanman auth = yes" is now consistently
     required for authenticated connections using the
     SMB1 LANMAN2 dialect.
   - "client ntlmv2 auth = yes" and "client use spnego = yes"
     (both the default values), require extended security (SPNEGO)
     support from the server. That means NTLMv2 is only used within
     NTLMSSP.

o  Tools like "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more obey the
   default of "client ldap sasl wrapping = sign". Even with
   "client ldap sasl wrapping = plain" they will automatically upgrade
   to "sign" when getting LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED from the LDAP
   server.

Changes since 4.4.0:
====================

o  Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
   * Bug 11344 - CVE-2015-5370: Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code.

o  Christian Ambach <ambi@samba.org>
   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
     April 12th, 2016.

o  Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
   * Bug 11644 - CVE-2016-2112: The LDAP client and server don't enforce
     integrity protection.

o  Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
   * Bug 11749 - CVE-2016-2111: NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability.

   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
     April 12th, 2016.

o  Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
     April 12th, 2016.

o  Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
   * Bug 11344 - CVE-2015-5370: Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code.

   * Bug 11616 - CVE-2016-2118: SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible.

   * Bug 11644 - CVE-2016-2112: The LDAP client and server doesn't enforce
     integrity protection.

   * Bug 11687 - CVE-2016-2114: "server signing = mandatory" not enforced.

   * Bug 11688 - CVE-2016-2110: Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP.

   * Bug 11749 - CVE-2016-2111: NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability.

   * Bug 11752 - CVE-2016-2113: Missing TLS certificate validation allows man in
     the middle attacks.

   * Bug 11756 - CVE-2016-2115: SMB client connections for IPC traffic are not
     integrity protected.

   * Bug 11804 - prerequisite backports for the security release on
     April 12th, 2016.




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